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Abstract
Optimal mechanisms have been provided in quite general multi-item settings [4], as long as
each bidder’s type distribution is given explicitly by listing every type in the support along with
its associated probability. In the implicit setting, e.g. when the bidders have additive valuations
with independent and/or continuous values for the items, these results do not apply, and it
was recently shown that exact revenue optimization is intractable, even when there is only one
bidder [8]. Even for item distributions with special structure, optimal mechanisms have been
surprisingly rare [13] and the problem is challenging even in the two-item case [10]. In this pa-
per, we provide a framework for designing optimal mechanisms using optimal transport theory
and duality theory. We instantiate our framework to obtain conditions under which only pricing
the grand bundle is optimal in multi-item settings (complementing the work of [13]), as well as
to characterize optimal two-item mechanisms. We use our results to derive closed-form descrip-
tions of the optimal mechanism in several two-item settings, exhibiting also a setting where a
continuum of lotteries is necessary for revenue optimization but a closed-form representation of
the mechanism can still be found efficiently using our framework.
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1 Introduction
Optimal mechanism design is the problem of designing a revenue-optimal auction for selling n items
to m bidders whose valuations are drawn from known prior distributions. The special case of selling
a single item is well-understood, going back to the work of [16] and [7]. The general (n > 1) case has
been much more challenging, and until very recently there has been no general solution. In a series
of recent papers, Cai et al. provided efficiently computable revenue-optimal [3, 4] or approximately
optimal mechanisms [5] in very general settings, including when there are combinatorial constraints
over which allocations of items to bidders are feasible, e.g. when these are matroid, matching, or
more general constraints. However, these results, as well as the more specialized ones of [1] for
service-constrained environments, apply to the explicit setting, i.e. when the distributions over
bidders’ valuations are given explicitly, by listing every valuation in their support together with
the probability it appears.
Clearly, the explicit is not the right model when the type distributions are continuous and/or
have extra structure that allows for more succinct representation. The obvious example, and the
setting that we study in this paper, is when the bidders have additive valuations with independent
values for different items. Here, each bidder’s type distribution can be described by providing
one marginal distribution per item, saving an exponential amount of information compared to the
explicit description. The issue is that such implicit settings turn out to be even more challenging
computationally. Indeed, essentially the only known positive results for additive bidders in the im-
plicit setting are for when the values are drawn from Monotone Hazard Rate distributions where [2]
obtain constant factor approximations to the optimal revenue, and [9, 6] obtain polynomial-time
approximation schemes. For general distributions but a single buyer, [10] show that selling the
items through separate auctions guarantees a O( 1
log2 n
)-fraction of the optimal revenue, which can
be improved to 12 for 2 items, even if the number of buyers is arbitrary. They also show that in the
single-buyer setting with identically distributed items, offering the grand bundle at some optimal
price guarantees a O( 1logn)-fraction of the optimal revenue. At the same time, exact polynomial-
time solutions have been recently precluded by [8], where it is shown that computing optimal
mechanisms is #P hard, even when there is a single additive bidder whose values for the items are
independent of support 2.
The scarcity of algorithmic results as well as the recent computational lower bound [8] are
consistent with our lack of structural understanding of the optimal mechanism in this setting.
It had been long known that selling the items separately is sub-optimal. Here is an example
from [10]: Suppose that there are two items and an additive bidder whose values are independent
and uniformly distributed in {1, 2}. It is easy to see that selling each item separately results in
expected revenue at most 2, while if the auctioneer only offers the bundle of both items for 3, the
expected revenue is 2.25. So bundling the items increases revenue. It is also known that, unlike
the single-item case, the optimal mechanism need not be deterministic [17, 13, 14, 11]. Here is an
example from [8]: Suppose there are two items and an additive bidder whose values are independent
and uniformly distributed in {1, 2} and {1, 3} respectively. In this scenario, the optimal mechanism
offers the bundle of both the items at price 4; it also offers at price 2.5 a lottery that, with probability
1/2, gives both items and, with probability 1/2, offers just the first item.
Besides these two insights (that bundling and randomization help) surprisingly little is known
about the structure of the optimal mechanism, even in the single-bidder case that we consider in
this paper. [15] proposed conditions under which the optimal mechanism is deterministic, however
these were found insufficient by [17] and [13]. The advantage of deterministic mechanisms is that
they have a finite description: the price they charge for every possible bundle of the items. Hence
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looking for the optimal one is feasible, computational considerations aside. On the other hand,
randomization adds an extra layer of difficulty: it is possible—we exhibit such an example in
Section 11—that the optimal mechanism offers a continuum of lotteries. Hence it is a priori not
clear whether one could hope for a concise (even a finite) description of the optimal mechanism, and
it is even less clear whether one can optimize over the corresponding space of (infinite-dimensional)
mechanisms.
In this paper, we develop a general optimization framework for obtaining closed-form descrip-
tions of optimal mechanisms in multi-item settings with one additive buyer with independent values
for the items, where each value is distributed according to a continuous distribution specified by a
closed-form description of its probability density function. Our framework is outlined below:
1. Optimal mechanism design in our setting is known to be reducible to optimizing a specific
integral objective of the utility function u : Rn≥0 → R of the buyer, with the constraint that
u is increasing, convex, and continuous with gradient ∇u ∈ [0, 1]n almost everywhere; see
e.g. [13]. We describe this formulation in Section 2.
2. Our first step is to relax this optimization problem (Section 4) by relaxing the convexity
constraint. This constraint is intimately related to the truthfulness of the resulting mecha-
nism; and, when violated, truthfulness and as a consequence revenue optimality are at stake.
Regardless, we relax this constraint for developing our framework, and restore it only for our
end results.
3. We provide a dual to the relaxed problem, which amounts to the following optimal transport
problem:
• Input: Two probability measures µ and ν on Rn≥0, implicitly defined by the buyer’s
value distributions;
• Output: The optimal transport from µ to ν, where the cost of transferring a unit of
probability mass from point x to point y is
∑
imax{xi − yi, 0}.
This dual problem is a continuous analog of minimum-weight bipartite matching. We prove a
complementary slackness condition (Theorem 1) for certifying optimality of primal and dual
solutions.
4. The end products of our dual relaxation, complementary slackness, and restoration of con-
vexity are two structural theorems for optimal mechanism design:
• Theorem 3 provides a condition under which the optimal mechanism is a take-it-or-
leave-it offer of the grand bundle at some critical price p∗; p∗ is not arbitrary but the
boundary of a convex region of a particular measure, which we show how to define in
Section 7. Instantiating Theorem 3,
– (exponential distributions) we analytically derive the optimal mechanism for two
items distributed according to exponential distributions with arbitrary parameters
λ1, λ2; we show that the optimal mechanism offers two options: (i) the grand
bundle at some price and (ii) at a different price, the item with the thinner tail with
probability 1 and the other item with probability min{λi}max{λi} ; see Section 9.
– (power-law distributions) we exhibit a setting with two items distributed according
to non-identical power law distributions where the optimal mechanism only offers
the grand bundle; see Section 8.
• Theorem 6 provides our general characterization of the optimal mechanism for two items.
The characterization applies to settings that are canonical according to Definition 10.
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Under this condition, the optimal mechanism is succinctly described in terms of a de-
creasing, concave and continuous function in R2: all types under this function are allo-
cated nothing and pay nothing; all other types are matched to a point of the function, in
some canonical way specified by Theorem 6, and their allocation probabilities correspond
to derivatives of the function at the corresponding point. Using our general theorem,
– (beta distributions) we exhibit a setting with two items distributed according to
non-identical beta distributions where the optimal mechanism offers a continuum of
lotteries; see Example 4 in Section 11. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
known explicit setting with two independent values where the optimal mechanism
comprises a continuum of lotteries.
5. In the proofs of our structural theorems, we employ Strassen’s theorem on stochastic domi-
nation of measures [12]. As a consequence of our proof technique, we introduce a condition
on stochastic domination in both our results. As it may be cumbersome to check stochastic
domination, we develop an alternate condition (see Theorem 4) that implies stochastic domi-
nation. Our new condition is of independent interest to measure theory, and will be useful to
the user of our results. Indeed, we rely on it for all our 2-item applications described above.
2 The Revenue-Maximization Program
We aim to find the revenue-optimal mechanism M for selling n goods to a single additive bidder
whose values z = (z1, ..., zn) for the goods are drawn independently from probability distributions
with given densities fi(zi) : R≥0 → R≥0, for all i. M takes as input the vector z of bidder’s values
and outputs the probability with which he will receive each good along with the price that he needs
to pay for this allocation. That is,M consists of two functions P : Rn≥0 → [0, 1]
n and T : Rn≥0 → R
that give, respectively, the vector of allocation probabilities and the price that the bidder pays, as
a function of the bidder’s values.
The bidder receives utility U(z, p, t) = z · p − t when his values for the items are z and he is
offered the items with probabilities p at price t.
We restrict our attention to mechanisms that are incentive compatible, meaning that the bidder
must have adequate incentives to reveal his values for the items truthfully, and individually rational,
meaning that the bidder has an incentive to participate in the mechanism.
Definition 1. The mechanism M is incentive compatible (IC) if and only if U(z,P(z),T (z)) ≥
U(z,P(z′),T (z′)) for all z, z′ ∈ Rn≥0.
Definition 2. The mechanism M is individually rational (IR) if and only if U(z,P(z),T (z)) ≥ 0
for all z ∈ Rn≥0.
When we enforce the IC constraints, we can assume that the buyer truthfully reports his type
to the mechanism. Under this assumption, let u : Rn≥0 → R be the function that maps the buyer’s
valuation to the utility he receives by the mechanism M. We have that u(z) = U(z,P(z),T (z)).
As noted in [13], the mechanism can be uniquely determined by providing its corresponding
utility function u. We readily use the characterization that the mechanism is IC if and only if u is
non-decreasing, convex, continuous, and ∇u ∈ [0, 1]n almost everywhere. We additionally require
that u(z) ≥ 0 to satisfy the IR constraint. Given u we can compute the functions P and T by
using the fact that P(z) = ∇u(z) and T (z) = ∇u(z) · z − u(z).
Therefore, to find the revenue-optimal mechanism, we need to determine, given the probability
density function f(z) =
∏
i fi(zi), a nonnegative, nondecreasing, convex and continuous function u
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with ∇u ∈ [0, 1]n almost everywhere such that the integral shown below (which equals the expected
revenue) is maximized: ∫
Rn
≥0
T (z)f(z)dz =
∫
Rn
≥0
[∇u(z) · z − u(z)] f(z)dz. (1)
Throughout the paper, we make the following assumptions about the distribution of the buyer’s
value for each item:
• The points where fi(zi) is strictly positive lie within a semi-open (not necessarily bounded)
interval Di , [d
−
i , d
+
i ), where d
−
i is nonnegative and d
+
i is possibly infinite.
• fi(zi) is continuously differentiable on Di.
• d−i fi(d
−
i ) = 0.
• limzi→d+i
z2i fi(zi) = 0 .
We denote by D ⊆ Rn≥0 the set ×iDi. We now explicitly write down the expected revenue:
∫ d+n
d−n
· · ·
∫ d+1
d−1
(
z1
∂u
∂zi
+ · · · + zn
∂u
∂zn
− u(z)
)
f1(z1) · · · fn(zn)dz1 · · · dzn.
Integrating by parts, we see that
∫ d+i
d−i
zi
∂u
∂zi
fi(zi)dzi = lim
M→d+i
u(zi, z−i)zifi(zi)|
zi=M
zi=d
−
i
−
∫ d+i
d−i
u(zi, z−i)(fi(zi) + zif
′
i(zi))dzi.
Since u(zi, z−i) ≤
∑
j zj and z
2
i fi(zi) → 0 as zi → d
+
i , we see that the first term is 0 for any fixed
z−i. Therefore, we have
∫ d+i
d−i
zi
∂u
∂zi
fi(zi)dzi = −
∫ d+i
d−i
u(zi, z−i)(fi(zi) + zif
′
i(zi))dzi
and thus the integral giving the expected revenue for a chosen utility function u is∫
D
u(z) (−∇f(z) · z − (n+ 1)f(z)) dz. (2)
3 Separating into Two Spaces
We denote by d− the point (d
−
1 , . . . , d
−
n ) ∈ D. For reasons which will become clear later, we treat the
point d− differently from the rest of D. The formulation of Section 2 naturally separates D \ {d−}
into two regions:
X = {z ∈ D : −∇f(z) · z > (n+ 1)f(z)} \ {d−}
Y = {z ∈ D : −∇f(z) · z ≤ (n+ 1)f(z)} \ {d−}.
To maximize revenue, we aim for u to be large on X yet small on Y. We define the density functions
µXd : X → R and ν
Y
d : Y → R by
µXd (x) = −∇f(x) · x− (n+ 1)f(x); ν
Y
d (y) = (n+ 1)f(y) +∇f(y) · y
and define the corresponding measures µX and νY on X and Y, respectively.
4
With this notation, our problem is to find the function u : D → R maximizing∫
X
u(x)µXd (x)dx−
∫
Y
u(y)νYd (y)dy
subject to the constraints mentioned in Section 2.1 We notice that u(d−) = 0 in any optimal
mechanism.2 Furthermore, we will show momentarily that µX (X ) = νY(Y) − 1. For technical
reasons, we desire for the masses of the spaces to be equal under their respective measures, and we
therefore insert the point d− into X by defining the space X0 , X ∪ {d−}, and extending µ
X by
setting µX0({d−}) = 1 and µ
X0(A) = µX (A) for all A ⊆ X .
Claim 1. µX0(X0) = ν
Y(Y).
Proof. It suffices to show that
∫
Y ν
Y(y)dy −
∫
X µ
X (x)dx = 1. Indeed, we have
∫
Y
νY(y)dy −
∫
X
µX (x)dx = −
∫
D
(−∇f(z) · z − (n+ 1)f(z))dz.
We note that
∫
D(−∇f(z) · z − (n + 1)f(z))dz is the expected revenue under the constant utility
function u(z) = 1. (To see this recall that (2) represents the expected revenue under utility function
u.) The expected revenue in this case is −1 (see this by plugging u(·) = 1 into (1), which is the
alternative expression for expected revenue), and thus
∫
Y ν
Y(y)dy−
∫
X µ
X (x)dx = 1, as desired.
In summary, our goal is to find the function u : D → R which maximizes∫
X0
u(x)dµX0 −
∫
Y
u(y)dνY
subject to the constraints that u is nondecreasing, convex, continuous and ∇u ∈ [0, 1]n almost
everywhere, and u(d−) = 0.
d−
Y
X
Figure 1: Y is the region in which −∇f(z) ·z−(n+1)f(z) ≤ 0 (excluding d−), while X is the region
in which the quantity is positive. We define X0 = X ∪ {d−}, and set µ
X0({d−}) = ν
Y(Y)− µX (X ).
In all examples considered in this paper, d− is “surrounded” only by points in the Y region.
1We note that any u : D → R≥0 can be appropriately extended to u : R
n
≥0 → R while preserving all constraints.
We therefore restrict our attention to u : D→ R≥0.
2If u(d−) > 0 then we could charge all players an additional u(d−), thereby subtracting u(d−) from the utility
function everywhere and increasing revenue.
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Example 1 (Exponential Distribution). Suppose that the pdf of each item i is given by fi(zi) =
λie
−λizi for zi ∈ [0,∞). Then zif
′
i(zi)/fi(zi) = −λizi and thus
X =
{
z :
∑
λizi > n+ 1
}
; Y =
{
z :
∑
λizi ≤ n+ 1
}
\ {~0}.
We also have
µXd (x) =
∏
λi
(∑
λixi − n− 1
)
e−
∑
λixi ; νYd (y) =
∏
λi
(
n+ 1−
∑
λiyi
)
e−
∑
λiyi
where µXd and ν
Y
d are defined on X and Y, respectively. We extend µ
X to the space X0 by setting
µX0({~0}) = 1.
Example 2 (Power-Law Distribution). Suppose that the pdf of item i is given by fi(zi) =
ci−1
(1+zi)ci
for zi ∈ [0,∞), where each ci > 2. (This restriction is necessary for limzi→∞ z
2
i fi(zi) = 0.) Then
−zif
′
i(zi)/fi(zi) = cizi/(1 + zi) and thus
X =
{
z :
∑ cizi
1 + zi
> n+ 1
}
; Y =
{
z :
∑ cizi
1 + zi
≤ n+ 1
}
\ {~0}.
We also have
µXd (x) =
∏
i
ci − 1
(1 + xi)ci
·

∑
j
cjxj
1 + xj
− n− 1

 ; νYd (y) =∏
i
ci − 1
(1 + yi)ci
·

n+ 1−∑
j
cjyj
1 + yj

 .
Finally, we extend the measure µX to the space X0 by setting µ
X0({~0}) = 1.
4 The Relaxed Problem
We define the “cost function” c : X0 × Y → R by
c(x, y) ,
∑
i
max{xi − yi, 0}.
We notice that, if u satisfies our constraint that ∇u ∈ [0, 1]n almost everywhere and is continuous,
we have as a consequence that u(x) − u(y) ≤ c(x, y) for all x ∈ X , y ∈ Y. We therefore consider
the relaxed problem of maximizing ∫
X0
u(x)dµX −
∫
Y
u(y)dνY
subject only to the constraint that u(x)− u(y) ≤ c(x, y) for all x ∈ X0 and all y ∈ Y. The optimal
value of this relaxed program is therefore at least as large as the optimal revenue of the mechanism
design program. We hope to identify scenarios in which we can solve the relaxed problem and
in which the solution to the relaxed problem satisfies all of the original constraints. Indeed, if
the relaxed problem’s solution satisfies all original constraints, the solution is also optimal for the
original problem.
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5 Dual Relaxed Problem
Consider the problem
inf
∫
X0×Y
c(x, y)dγ(x, y) : γ ∈ Γ(µX0 , νY)
where Γ(µX0 , νY) is the set of all measures on X0 × Y with marginal measures µ
X0 and νY , re-
spectively.3 We call this the dual relaxed problem. Informally, this problem asks for the minimum
cost way of “transporting mass” to change the measure νY into the measure µX0 , and is a continu-
ous analog of the minimum-weight bipartite matching problem. Analogous to Monge-Kantorovich
duality from optimal transport theory [18], we have the following theorem, which is a continuous
version of the relationship between minimum-weight bipartite matching and its linear programming
dual:
Theorem 1. Suppose that there exist u∗, γ∗ feasible for the relaxed problem and the dual relaxed
problem, respectively, such that u∗(x) − u∗(y) = c(x, y), γ∗-almost surely. Then u∗ is optimal for
the relaxed problem and γ∗ is optimal for the dual relaxed problem.
Proof. We have4∫
X0×Y
c(x, y)dγ ≥
∫
X0×Y
(u(x)− u(y))dγ = νY(Y)
(∫
X0
u(x)dµX0 −
∫
Y
u(y)dνY
)
for any feasible u and γ. Therefore, the optimal value of the relaxed primal is at most 1/ν(Y) times
the optimal value of the relaxed dual. We also have∫
X0
u∗(x)dµX −
∫
Y
u∗(y)dνY =
1
νY(Y)
(∫
X0×Y
u∗(x)dγ∗ −
∫
X0×Y
u∗(y)dγ∗
)
=
1
νY(Y)
∫
X0×Y
(u∗(x)− u∗(y))dγ∗ =
1
νY(Y)
∫
X0×Y
c(x, y)dγ∗.
Since we have found u∗ and γ∗ such that the value of the relaxed primal is exactly 1/νY(Y) the value
of the relaxed dual, we conclude that u∗ and γ∗ are both optimal for their respective problems.
We may sometimes refer to γ∗ as an optimal transport map between X0 and Y, since it represents
the lowest-cost method of transporting mass between the two measure spaces.
6 Strassen’s Theorem and Stochastic Dominance
Our overall goal is to find u∗ and γ∗ satisfying the conditions of Theorem 1, and thereby are optimal
for their respective problems. However, it may be difficult to explicitly define an appropriate
measure γ∗ ∈ Γ(µX0 , νY). Instead, we will often make use of a theorem of Strassen, which allows
us to prove the existence of such γ∗ by demonstrating that one measure stochastically dominates
another. (Informally, measure α “stochastically dominates” β if β can be transformed into α by
moving mass only in positive directions.)
Definition 3. We denote by  the partial ordering on Rn≥0 where a  b if and only if ai ≤ bi for
all i. In terms of this partial ordering, we make the following definitions.
3That is, γ(A,Y) = µX0(A)νY(Y) for all measurable A ⊆ X0, and analogously for the other marginal.
4Recalling that νY (Y) = µX0(X0).
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A function f : Rn≥0 → R is increasing if a  b⇒ f(a) ≤ f(b).
A set S ⊂ Rn is increasing if a ∈ S and a  b implies b ∈ S, and decreasing if a ∈ S and b  a
implies b ∈ S.
Definition 4. For two measures α, β on Rn≥0, we say that α stochastically dominates β (with
respect to the partial order ), denoted β  α, if
∫
R
n
≥0
fdα ≥
∫
R
n
≥0
fdβ for all increasing bounded
measurable functions f .5 Similarly, if g, h are density functions, h  g if
∫
~x∈Rn≥0
f(~x)h(~x)d~x ≤∫
~x∈Rn
≥0
f(~x)g(~x)d~x for all increasing bounded measurable functions f .
We now apply a theorem of Strassen for the partial order , using the formulation from [12]
and noting that the set {(a, b) : a  b} is closed:
Theorem 2 (Strassen). If α and β are probability measures on Rn≥0 and α stochastically dominates
β with respect to , then there exists a probability measure γˆ ∈ Γ(α, β) on Rn≥0×R
n
≥0 with marginals
α and β respectively such that γˆ({(a, b) : b  a}) = 1.
The choice of  is justified by the following observation (as will become clear in the next
section): if types x ∈ X and y ∈ Y both receive the grand bundle at price p under a utility function
u, then u(x)− u(y) = c(x, y) if and only if y  x.
7 Optimality of Grand Bundling
Our goal in this section is to identify conditions under which the solution to the relaxed problem is
a take-it-or-leave-it offer of the grand bundle for some price p∗. In this case, the relaxed solution is
clearly also a solution of the original mechanism design instance. (In particular, the utility function
is convex.) Our proof of optimality relies on Theorem 1.
Definition 5. For any p > 0, we define Zp and Wp by
Zp ,
{
y ∈ D \ {d−} :
∑
yi ≤ p
}
; Wp , D \ (Zp ∪ {d−}).
That is, Zp (along with d−) is the set of types which will receive no goods under the grand
bundle price p. We aim to find a price p such that Zp ⊆ Y and such that our transport map can
send all of Zp to {d−}.
Definition 6. We say that p∗ > 0 is a critical bundle price if Zp∗ ⊆ Y and∫
Zp∗
νY(y)dy =
∫
Y
νY(y)dy −
∫
X
µX (x)dx = 1.
Even if a critical bundle price p∗ exists, it is not necessarily true that the optimal mechanism
is a simple take-it-or-leave-it offer of all goods for price p∗.
Theorem 3. Suppose that there exists a critical bundle price p∗ such that µX |Wp∗  ν
Y |Wp∗ . Then
the optimal mechanism is a take-it-or-leave-it offer of the grand bundle for price p∗.6
5Throughout the paper whenever we use the terms “measure” or “measurable” we use them with respect to the
Borel σ-algebra.
6If α is a measure and S ⊂ Rn≥0, then the restriction α|S is the measure such that α|S(A) , α(A ∩ S) for all
measurable A.
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d− p
∗
p∗
Wp∗ ∩ Y
Wp∗ ∩ X
Zp∗
z1
z 2
Figure 2: The price p∗ is a critical bundle price if Zp∗ ⊆ Y and
∫
Zp∗
νY(y)dy = µX0({d−}). If p
∗
is a critical bundle price and µX |Wp∗  ν
Y |Wp∗ , then a take-it-or-leave-it offer of all items for p
∗ is
the optimal mechanism. While this diagram is drawn with n = 2, the result holds for arbitrary n.
Proof. Suppose that there exists such a critical bundle price p∗. By Strassen’s theorem, since
µX |Wp∗  ν
Y |Wp∗ , there exists a transport map γ
∗
1 ∈ Γ(µ
X |Wp∗ , ν
Y |Wp∗ ) such that, for x ∈Wp∗ ∩X
and y ∈Wp∗ ∩Y, it holds that x  y, γ
∗
1 almost-surely. Since x and y are in Wp∗ , a bidder of either
type receives the grand bundle for price p∗. Thus, under the utility u∗ of the bundling mechanism:
u∗(x)− u∗(y) = (
∑
xi − p
∗)− (
∑
yi − p
∗) =
∑
i
(xi − yi) = c(x, y),
where the final equality follows from x  y. We now extend γ∗1 to a transport map γ
∗ ∈ (µX0 , νY)
by mapping between d− ∈ X0 and all of Zp∗ ⊆ Y. Indeed, such a map exists since µ
X0({d−}) =
νY(Zp∗). We notice that any bidder of type y ∈ Zp∗ or d− receives zero utility under u
∗. Thus, we
have u∗(d−)− u
∗(y) = 0 = c(d−, y), since d−  y.
The existence of the transport map γ∗ proves that the bundling utility function u∗ is optimal
for the relaxed problem, by Theorem 1. Since u∗ clearly satisfies all of the original mechanism
design constraints, it is indeed the utility function of the optimal mechanism.
It is oftentimes difficult to verify directly that µX |Wp∗  ν
Y |Wp∗ . In two dimensions, we will
make use of Theorem 4, which provides a sufficient condition for a measure to stochastically dom-
inate another. This theorem is an application of the lemma (proven in the Appendix) that an
equivalent condition for dominance is that one measure has more mass than the other on all sets
which are the union of finitely many “increasing boxes.” Under the conditions of Theorem 4, we
are able to induct on the number of boxes by removing one box at a time. For application to
Theorem 3, we only need to use Theorem 4 in the special case that C = D and R = Zp∗, but in
Section 9 we will use the more general form of the theorem. The proof of Theorem 4 is in the
Appendix.
Informally, Theorem 4 deals with the scenario where two density functions, g and h, are both
nonzero only on some set C \R, where R is a decreasing subset of C. To prove that g  h, it suffices
to verify that (1) g − h has an appropriate form (2) the integral of g − h on C is positive and (3) if
we integrate g − h along either a vertical or horizontal line outwards starting from any point in R,
the result is negative.
Theorem 4. Let C = [c1, d
+
1 )×[c2, d
+
2 ), R be a decreasing nonempty subset of C, and g, h : C → R≥0
be bounded density functions which are 0 on R, have finite total mass, and satisfy
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•
∫
C(g − h)dxdy ≥ 0.
• For any basis vector ei ∈ {(0, 1), (1, 0)} and any point z
∗ ∈ R:
∫ d+i −z∗i
0
g(z∗ + τei)− h(z
∗ + τei)dτ ≤ 0.
• There exist non-negative functions α : [c1, d
+
1 ) → R≥0, β : [c2, d
+
2 ) → R≥0 and an increasing
function η : C → R such that
g(z1, z2)− h(z1, z2) = α(z1) · β(z2) · η(z1, z2)
for all (z1, z2) ∈ C \R.
Then g  h.
When we prove optimality of grand bundling, we will apply Theorem 4 with g and h being the
densities of µX |Wp∗ and ν
Y |Wp∗ , respectively.
8 Numerical Example: Bundling Two Power-Law Items
In this section, we derive, as an application of Theorem 3, the optimal mechanism for an instance
of selling two goods which are distributed according to power-law distributions. We exhibit that
the optimal mechanism is a take-it-or-leave-it offer of the grand bundle, and we find the right price
to charge for it. Unlike our example in the next section for exponentially distributed items (where
we perform our calculations for arbitrary pairs of exponential distributions), here we demonstrate
how numerical computations can be used to prove optimality of grand bundling in a single instance.
Indeed, since the integrals involved in our computations may be complicated, we suspect that this
numerical approach will frequently be useful.
We proceed with our goal of deducing the optimal mechanism for selling two goods, where the
distribution of each good has probability density function fi(zi) =
ci−1
(1+zi)ci
for zi ∈ [0,∞). In this
example, we fix c1 = 6 and c2 = 7.
8.1 Numerically Computing the Critical Bundle Price
We begin by computing the critical bundle price p∗, as prescribed by Definition 6. In particular,
we first solve for p∗ such that∫ p∗
0
∫ p∗−z2
0
(
3−
c1z1
1 + z1
−
c2z2
1 + z2
)
c1 − 1
(1 + z1)c1
·
c2 − 1
(1 + z2)c2
dz1dz2 = 1
and numerically determine that p∗ ≈ .35725. Thus, if there indeed exists a critical bundle price, it
must have value p∗.
Next, to confirm that p∗ is a critical bundle price, we must verify that Zp∗ ⊆ Y. That is, we
must show that for all z with z1 + z2 ≤ p
∗, it holds that c1z11+z1 +
c2z2
1+z2
≤ 3.
Since the left-hand side of the inequality is an increasing function, it suffices to prove the
inequality when z1 + z2 = p
∗. Substituting for z2, the left-hand side of the above inequality
becomes c1z11+z1 +
c2p∗−c2z1
1+p∗−z1
.
We numerically compute, after setting c1 = 6 and c2 = 7, that the expression is maximized by
z1 = 0.133226, achieving value 1.98654. Since 1.98654 is significantly less than 3, we conclude that
p∗ is indeed a critical price, even taking into consideration possible errors of precision.
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8.2 Verifying Stochastic Dominance
Given Theorem 3, all that remains to prove optimality of grand bundling is to verify that µX |Wp∗ 
νY |Wp∗ .We prove this stochastic dominance using Theorem 4 with g = µ
X
d |Wp∗ and h = ν
Y
d |Wp∗ . In-
deed, Theorem 4 applies in this case, and the verification of stochastic dominance is in Appendix B.
In conclusion, we obtain:
Example 3. The optimal mechanism for selling two independent goods with densities f1(z1) =
5/(1 + z1)
6 and f2(z2) = 6/(1 + z2)
7 respectively is a take-it-or-leave-it offer of the bundle of the
two goods for price p∗ ≈ .35725.
9 Complete Solution for Two Exponential Items
In this section we provide a closed-form description of the optimal mechanism for two independent
exponentially distributed items. The description of the optimal mechanism is given by Theorem 5.
In this case, the optimal mechanism has richer structure than only offering the grand bundle at
some price.
In the next subsections, when it does not provide significant additional complications, we per-
form computations for n exponentially distributed items, as these calculations may prove useful in
extensions of our result. We denote by λi the parameters of the exponential distributions, and by
λmin = mini λi and λmax = maxi λi
9.1 The Critical Price p∗
Definition 7. For any 0 < p ≤ 2/λmin, we define the zero space, Z
′
p ⊂ Y ∪ {~0}, to be
Z ′p ,
{
y ∈ R2≥0 :
∑
yi ≤ p and
∑
λiyi ≤ 2
}
.
See Figure 3 for an example of a zero space. In terms of Z ′p we make the following definition.
Definition 8. For all λ1, λ2 > 0, the critical price p
∗ = p∗(λ1, λ2) is the unique 0 < p
∗ ≤ 2/λmin
such that
νY(Z ′p∗) =
∫
Y
dνY(y)−
∫
X
dµX (x) = 1.
Note that the critical price differs from the critical bundle price defined in Section 7 in that the
critical price is defined with respect to the space Z ′p instead of Zp.
Claim 2. For all λ1, λ2 > 0, the critical price is well-defined.
Proof. We need to show that there is a unique solution to the equation defining the critical price.
We note that νY(Z ′p) is strictly increasing in p for p in the range [0, 2/λmin], and that ν
Y(Z0) = 0.
Therefore, all that remains is to show that νY(Z ′2/λmin) ≥ 1.We note that Z
′
2/λmin
= {y :
∑
λiyi ≤ 2} ,
and we now compute
∫
Z′
2/λmin
dνY(y) = λ1λ2
∫ 2
λ2
0
∫ 2
λ1
−
λ2y2
λ1
0
(3− λ1y1 − λ2y2)e
−λ1y1−λ2y2dy1dy2
= λ1λ2
∫ 2/λ2
0
e−λ2y2(2− λ2y2)dy2
λ1
= λ1λ2 ·
1 + 1e2
λ1λ2
> 1,
as desired.
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Our goal in the remainder of this section is to prove the following theorem:
Theorem 5. For all λ1 ≥ λ2 > 0, the optimal utility function is the following:
up∗(z1, z2) =


0 if z1 + z2 ≤ p
∗ and λ1z1 + λ2z2 ≤ 2;
z1 + z2
λ2
λ1
− 2λ1 if z2
(
λ1−λ2
λ1
)
≤ p∗ − 2λ1 and λ1z1 + λ2z2 > 2;
z1 + z2 − p
∗ otherwise,
where p∗ = p∗(λ1, λ2) is the critical price of Definition 8. In particular, the optimal mechanism
offers the following menu:
1. Receive nothing, pay 0.
2. Receive the first item with probability 1 and the second item with probability λ2/λ1, pay 2/λ1.
3. Receive both items, pay p∗.
9.2 The Absorption Hyperplane
A useful feature of independent exponential distributions is that our measures µX0 and νY give
rise to a set H ⊂ Rn≥0, for which integrating the difference of the densities of µ
X0 and νY outwards
along any line starting from H yields 0. This set H provides useful geometric intuition behind the
structure of the optimal mechanism.
Claim 3. Suppose z ∈ Rn≥0 satisfies
∑
λjzj = n. Then, for any vector ~v ∈ R
n
≥0:
∫ ∞
0
(
n+ 1−
∑
i
λi(zi + τvi)
)
e−
∑
i λi(zi+τvi)dτ = 0.
Proof. We have
∫ ∞
0
(
n+ 1−
∑
i
λi(zi + τvi)
)
e−
∑
i λi(zi+τvi)dτ =
e−
∑
i λi(zi+τvi)(
∑
i λi(zi + τvi)− n)∑
i λivi
∣∣∣∣
∞
τ=0
= −
e−
∑
i λizi(
∑
i λizi − n)∑
λivi
= 0.
We refer to the set H = {z ∈ Rn≥0 :
∑
ziλi = n} as the absorption hyperplane, since integrating
(n + 1 −
∑
λixi)e
−
∑
λixi starting from any point in the set and going outwards in any positive
direction gives 0.
9.3 Proof of Optimality
In this section, we prove Theorem 5, which fully specifies the optimal mechanism for two indepen-
dent exponentially-distributed items.
By Theorem 1, we must prove that there exists γ∗ ∈ Γ(µX0 , νY) such that up∗(x) − up∗(y) =
c(x, y), γ∗-almost surely.
Our transport map γ∗ will be decomposed into γ1 + γ2 + γ3, where (see Figure 3 for reference)
1. γ1 ∈ Γ(µ
X0 |{~0}, ν
Y |Zp∗ )
2. γ2 ∈ Γ(µ
X0 |B∩X0 , ν
Y |B∩Y), where B =
{
z : λ1z + λ2z > 2 and z2
(
λ1−λ2
λ1
)
≤ p∗ − 2λ1
}
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3. γ3 ∈ Γ(µ
X0 |W∩X0 , ν
Y |W∩Y), where W =
{
z : z1 + z2 > p
∗ and z2
(
λ1−λ2
λ1
)
> p∗ − 2λ1
}
such that up∗(x)−up∗(y) = c(x, y) γi-almost surely for all i. We note that for each γi, the marginal
distributions of µ and ν that we are seeking to couple have the same total mass.
2
λ1
3
λ1
2
λ2
3
λ2
p∗
Z ′p∗
B ∩ Y
B ∩ X
W ∩ X
W ∩ Y
absorption
hyperplane
z 2
Figure 3: The decomposition of Rn≥0 for the
proof of Theorem 5. In this diagram, p∗ >
2/λ1. If p
∗ ≤ 2/λ1, B is empty.
2
λ2
3
λ2
p∗
λ1p∗−2
λ1−λ2
νY |W∩Y
µX |W∩X
z1
Figure 4: To prove the existence of γ3, we
must show that µX |W∩X  ν
Y |W∩Y .
We proceed to prove the existence of each γi separately.
1. We have µX0({~0}) = νY(Z ′p∗), by definition of p
∗. Furthermore, c(~0, y) = 0 for all y. Therefore,
since up∗(y) = 0 for all y ∈ Zp∗ , the equality u(~0)− u(y) = c(x, y) is trivially satisfied for all
y ∈ Z ′p∗ . We can therefore take γ1 to assign probability mass to ({~0}×Z) equal to ν
Y(Z) for
each subset Z ⊆ Z ′p∗ .
2. We note that B consists of all points to the right of the absorption hyperplane with z2
coordinate less than a particular threshold. Therefore, for any z∗2 , we have by Claim 3:
∫ 3−λ2z∗z
λ1
2−λ2z
∗
2
λ1
(3− λ1z1 − λ2z
∗
2) e
−λ1z1−λ2z∗2dz1 =
∫ ∞
3−λ2z
∗
2
λ1
(λ1z1 + λ2z
∗
2 − 3) e
−λ1z1−λ2z∗2dz1.
From this we deduce that we can choose the measure γ2 ∈ Γ(µ
X0 |B∩X0 , ν
Y |B∩Y) so that
positive density is only placed on pairs of points (x, y) with x2 = y2, i.e. with their second
coordinates equal. Indeed, we notice that, for x ∈ B ∩ X0 and y ∈ B ∩ Y,
up∗(x)− up∗(y) = x1 + x2
λ2
λ1
− y1 − y2
λ2
λ1
.
Therefore, if x2 = y2 (which we take to hold γ2-almost surely), then up∗(x) − up∗(y) =
x1 − y1 = c(x, y), as desired.
3. In region W, our mechanism sells the grand bundle for price p∗. To prove the existence of
measure γ3, it suffices to prove that µ
X0 |W∩X0  ν
Y |W∩Y , as illustrated in Figure 4. Indeed,
then Strassen’s theorem (Theorem 2) implies that γ3 ∈ Γ(µ
X0 |W∩X0 , ν
Y |W∩Y) exists so that
pairs of points (x, y) sampled from γ3 satisfy y  x almost surely, which in turn implies that
up∗(x)− up∗(y) = (x1 + x2 − p
∗)− (y1 + y2 − p
∗) = c(x, y) almost surely.
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The desired stochastic dominance follows from Theorem 4, taking g and h to be the density
functions of µX0 |W∩X and ν
Y |W∩Y , respectively, and noticing that, restricted within W, Z
′
p∗
lies below the absorption hyperplane.7
This concludes the proof of Theorem 5. We notice that, if p∗ ≤ 2/λmax, then the region B is
empty, and Z ′p∗ is simply the region below the 45
◦ line given by z1 + z2 = p
∗.
Corollary 1. If p∗ ≤ 2/λmax, then the optimal mechanism is a take-it-or-leave-it offer of the grand
bundle for price p∗.
10 General Characterization of Two-Item Optimal Mechanisms
We now generalize the approach of Section 9 to further understand the structure of optimal mech-
anisms. The following definition is summarized by Figure 5.
Definition 9. A canonical zero set for the two-item optimal mechanism design problem is a
nonempty closed subset Z of D1 × D2, where Z is decreasing and convex. We denote by s :
[d−1 , c]→ D2 (with c < d
+
1 ) the outer boundary of Z.
8 That is:
Z =
{
(z1, z2) : z1 ∈ [d
−
1 , c] and z2 ≤ s(z1)
}
.
We require that s be differentiable almost everywhere.
We denote by a, b ∈ [d−1 , c] points such that:
• 0 ≥ s′(z1) ≥ −1 for z1 ∈ [d
−
1 , a]
• s′(z1) = −1 for z1 ∈ [a, b]
• s′(z1) ≤ −1 for z1 ∈ [b, c].
A canonical zero set Z gives rise to a canonical partition of D1 ×D2 into four regions, Z, A,
B, W, where:
• A = ([d−1 , a]×D2) \ Z
• B = ([b, d+1 )× [d
−
2 , s(b)]) \ Z
• W = D1 ×D2 \ (Z ∪ A ∪ B) = ((a, d
+
1 )× (s(b), d
+
2 )) \ Z,
as shown in Figure 5.
If a canonical partition is well-formed according to the following definition, then Theorem 6
characterizes the structure of the optimal mechanism.
Definition 10. A canonical partition s, Z,A,B,W is well-formed if the following conditions are
satisfied:
• For all z ∈ Z \ {d−}, it holds that (n+ 1)f(z) +∇f(z) · z ≥ 0; i.e. Z \ {d−} lies in Y.
• The following equality holds:∫
Z
((n + 1)f(z) +∇f(z) · z)dz =
∫
D1×D2
((n + 1)f(z) +∇f(z) · z)dz;
i.e. the mass assigned by νY to Z equals µX0({d−}).
7It is straightforward to verify that all of the conditions of Theorem 4 hold. In particular, since Z′p∗ lies under the
absorption hyperplane, the second criterion for Theorem 4 is trivially satisfied.
8While s need not be a function, it is notationally convenient to refer to it as such. In Theorem 6, we only refer to
“s(z1)” when the slope of s is between horizontal and 45
◦ downwards, and only refer to “s−1(z2)” when the slope is
between 45◦ downwards and vertical. To be strictly formal, we could define s to be the set of points on the boundary.
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d−2
d+2
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
B
W
A curve of s
z1
z 2
Figure 5: A canonical partition of D1 ×D2
• For all z1 ∈ [d
−
1 , a], it holds that:
∫ d+2
s(z1)
((n+ 1)f(z) +∇f(z) · z) dz2 = 0; i.e. ν
Y and µX place
the exact same mass on every vertical line originating from a point (z1, s(z1)), z1 ∈ [d
−
1 , a]
and going upwards.
• For all z2 ∈ [d
−
2 , s(b)], it holds that:
∫ d+1
s−1(z2)
((n+ 1)f(z) +∇f(z) · z) dz1 = 0; i.e. ν
Y and µX
place the exact same mass on every horizontal line that starts from a point (s−1(z2), z2), z2 ∈
[d−2 , s(b)] and going rightwards.
• For all increasing subsets T ⊆ W, it holds that:
∫
T ((n+1)f(z)+∇f(z) · z)dz ≤ 0; i.e. µ
X |W
stochastically dominates νY |W .
Theorem 6. Let s, Z,A,B,W be a well-formed canonical partition of D1 ×D2. Then the optimal
mechanism behaves as follows for a bidder of declared type (z1, z2):
• If (z1, z2) ∈ Z, the bidder receives no goods and is charged 0.
• If (z1, z2) ∈ A, the bidder receives item 1 with probability −s
′(z1), item 2 with probability 1,
and is charged s(z1)− z1s
′(z1).
• If (z1, z2) ∈ B, the bidder receives item 1 with probability 1, item 2 with probability −1/s
′(s−1(z2)),
and is charged s−1(z2)− z2/s
′(s−1(z2)).
• If (z1, z2) ∈ W, the bidder receives both goods with probability 1 and is charged a+s(a) (where
a is as specified in Definition 9).
Note that Theorem 6 is symmetric with respect to relabeling z1 and z2 and replacing s, a, b,
and c with s−1, s−1(b), s−1(a), and s−1(0), respectively. Furthermore, we observe that Theorem 9
is a special case of this theorem, with Z = Z ′p∗ and A being empty.
Proof. The utility function u induced by the mechanism is as follows:
• If (z1, z2) ∈ Z, the utility is 0.
• If (z1, z2) ∈ A, the utility is z2 − s(z1).
• If (z1, z2) ∈ B, the utility is z1 − s
−1(z2).
• If (z1, z2) ∈ W, the utility is z1 + z2 − (a+ s(a)).
It is straightforward to show that there exists a transport map γ dual to u, and therefore u is
optimal for the relaxed problem. Indeed, γ maps between {d−} and Z, between A∩X and A∩Y,
between B ∩X and B ∩Y, and between W ∩X and W ∩Y. The full argument for the existence of
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γ is nearly identical to the argument given in the proof of Theorem 9. In particular, the existence
of an appropriate map between W ∩X and W ∩ Y follows from Strassen’s theorem.
Since a solution to the relaxed problem is not necessarily a solution to the original mechanism
design instance, it remains to show that the mechanism is truthful (or, equivalently, that u is con-
vex). We consider a bidder of type (z1, z2), and let (z
∗
1 , z
∗
2) be any other type. It is straightforward
to prove, through a small amount of casework, that that the bidder’s utility never increases by
declaring (z∗1 , z
∗
2) instead of (z1, z2). The full proof of this fact is in Appendix C.
11 Numerical Example: Optimal Mechanism for Two Beta Dis-
tributions
We obtain a closed-form description of the optimal mechanism for two items distributed according
to the Beta distributions shown below. Our approach here illustrates a general recipe for employing
our characterization theorem (Theorem 6) to find closed-form descriptions of optimal mechanisms,
comprising the following steps: (i) definition of the sets Stop and Sright, (ii) computation of a
critical price p∗; (iii) definition of a canonical partition in terms of (i) and (ii); and (iv) application
of Theorem 6.
Suppose that the probability density functions of our items are:
f1(z1) =
1
B(3, 3)
z21(1− z1)
2; f2(z2) =
1
B(3, 4)
z22(1− z2)
3
for all zi ∈ [0, 1), where B(·, ·) is the “beta function” and is used for normalization.
We compute −∇f(z) · z − 3f(z) = f1(z1)f2(z2)
(
2
1−z1
+ 31−z2 − 12
)
. Thus, we define
X =
{
z ∈ [0, 1)2 :
2
1− z1
+
3
1− z2
> 12
}
; Y =
{
z ∈ [0, 1)2 \ {~0} :
2
1− z1
+
3
1− z2
≤ 12
}
and we define the densities
µXd (z) = f(z)
(
2
1− z1
+
3
1− z2
− 12
)
· 1z∈X ; ν
Y
d (z) = f(z)
(
12−
2
1− z1
−
3
1− z2
)
· 1z∈Y .
Step (i). We now define the set Stop ⊂ [0, 1)
2 by the rule that (z1, z2) ∈ Stop if∫ 1
z2
(−∇f(z1, t) · (z1, t)− (n+ 1)f(z1, t)) dt = 0.
That is, starting from any point in z ∈ Stop and integrating µ
X
d (z1, t) − µ
Y
d (z1, t) “upwards” from
t = z2 to t = 1 yields zero. Similarly, we say that (z1, z2) ∈ Sright if∫ 1
z1
(−∇f(t, z2) · (t, z2)− (n+ 1)f(t, z2)) dt = 0.
Notice that, since X is an increasing set, Stop and Sright must both be subsets of Y. We compute
analytically that (z1, z2) ∈ [0, 1)
2 is in Stop if and only if
z1 =
2(−1− 3z2 − 6z
2
2 + 25z
3
2)
3(−1− 3z2 − 6z22 + 20z
3
2)
.
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Figure 6: The well-formed canonical partition for f1(z1) =
z21(1−z1)
2
B(3,3) and f2(z2) =
z22(1−z2)
3
B(3,4) .
Similarly, (z1, z2) ∈ [0, 1)
2 is in Sright if and only if z2 =
2(−2−4z1−6z21+27z
3
1)
−7−14z1−21z21+72z
3
1
.
In particular, for any z1 ∈ [0, .63718) there exists a z2 such that (z1, z2) ∈ Sright, and there does
not exist such a z2 if z1 > .63718. Furthermore, it is straightforward to verify (by computing second
derivatives in the appropriate regime) that the region below Stop and the region below Sright are
convex.
Step (ii). We now compute p∗ = 0.71307 (this choice will be explained later- it is the z2-
intercept of the 45◦ line in Figure 6 which causes νY(Z) = µX0({~0})) and define the set L ={
z ∈ [0, 1)2 : z1 + z2 = p
∗
}
. We compute that L∩Stop contains the point (.16016, .55291) and that
L ∩ Sright contains the point (.62307, 0.09). We now define the curve s : [0, .63718] → D2 by
s(z1) =


z2 such that (z1, z2) ∈ Stop if 0 ≤ z1 ≤ .16016
.71307 − z1 if .16016 ≤ z1 ≤ .62307
z2 such that (z1, z2) ∈ Sright if .62307 ≤ z1 ≤ .63718.
It is straightforward to verify that s is a concave, decreasing, continuous function.
Step (iii). We decompose [0, 1)2 into the following regions:
Z = {z : z1 ≤ 0.63718 and z2 ≤ s(z1)}; A = ([0, 0.16016] × (0, 1)) \ Z
B = ((0, 1) × [0, 0.09] \ Z; W = [0, 1)2 \ (Z ∪ A ∪ B)
as illustrated in Figure 6.
Step (iv). We note that every point in Z either lies below some point in Stop or to the left of some
point in Sright. Thus, since Y ∪ {~0} is a decreasing set and since both Stop and Sright are subsets of
Y, it follows that Z ⊆ Y.
It is straightforward to computationally verify — indeed, this was the reason for our choice of
p∗ — that νY(Z) = µX0({~0}). Furthermore, using Theorem 4 it is straightforward to verify that
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µX |W  ν
Y |W .
9 Therefore, we can directly apply Theorem 6 to this scenario to determine the
optimal mechanism.
Example 4. The optimal mechanism for selling independent goods whose valuations are distributed
according to f1(z1) =
z21(1−z1)
2
B(3,3) and f2(z2) =
z22(1−z2)
3
B(3,4) has the following outcome for a bidder of
type (z1, z2) in terms of the function s(·) defined above:
• If (z1, z2) ∈ Z, the bidder receives no goods and is charged 0.
• If (z1, z2) ∈ A, the bidder receives item 1 with probability −s
′(z1), item 2 with probability 1,
and is charged s(z1)− z1s
′(z1).
• If (z1, z2) ∈ B, the bidder receives item 1 with probability 1, item 2 with probability −1/s
′(s−1(z2)),
and is charged s−1(z2)− z2/s
′(s−1(z2)).
• If (z1, z2) ∈ W, the bidder receives both goods with probability 1 and is charged .71307.
Since s(z1) is not linear for z1 ∈ [0, .16016] and z1 ∈ [.62307, .63718], Example 4 shows that an
optimal mechanism might offer a continuum of randomized outcomes.
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A Verifying Stochastic Dominance
A.1 An Equivalent Condition for Stochastic Dominance
While Strassen’s theorem is useful, it may be difficult to directly verify that a measure α stochas-
tically dominates another measure β. Instead, we can check an equivalent condition, given by
Lemma 2. In preparation to state this lemma, we need a few claims and definitions.
Claim 4. Let α, β be finite measures on Rn≥0. A necessary and sufficient condition for β  α is
that for all increasing measurable sets A, α(A) ≥ β(A).
Proof. Without loss of generality assume that α(Rn≥0) = 1.
It is obvious that the condition is necessary by considering the indicator function of A. To prove
sufficiency, suppose that the condition holds and that on the contrary, α does not stochastically
dominate β. Then there exists an increasing, bounded, measurable function f such that∫
fdβ −
∫
fdα > 2−k+1
for some positive integer k. Without loss of generality, we may assume that f is nonnegative, by
adding the constant of f(0) to all values. We now define the function f˜ by point-wise rounding
f upwards to the nearest multiple of 2−k. Clearly f˜ is increasing, measurable, and bounded.
Furthermore, we have∫
f˜dβ −
∫
f˜dα ≥
∫
fdβ −
∫
fdα− 2−k > 2−k+1 − 2−k > 0.
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We notice, however, that f˜ can be decomposed into the weighted sum of indicator functions of
increasing sets. Indeed, let {r1, . . . , rm} be the set of all values taken by f˜ , where r1 > r2 > · · · > rm.
We notice that, for any s ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, the set As = {z : f˜(z) ≥ rs} is increasing and measurable.
Therefore, we may write
f˜ =
m∑
s=1
(rs − rs−1)Is
where Is is the indicator function for As and where we set r0 = 0. We now compute∫
f˜dβ =
m∑
s=1
(rs − rs−1)β(As) ≤
m∑
s=1
(rs − rs−1)α(As) =
∫
f˜dα,
contradicting the fact that
∫
f˜dβ >
∫
f˜dα.
Given the above claim, to verify that µ stochastically dominates ν, we must ensure that µ(A) ≥
ν(A) for all increasing measurable sets A. This verification might still be difficult, since A has
somewhat unconstrained structure. Our aim is to prove Lemma 2, which will simplify this task
further.
Definition 11. For any z ∈ Rn≥0, we define the base rooted at z to be
Bz , {z
′ : z  z′},
the minimal increasing set containing z.
We denote by Qk to be the set of points in R
n
≥0 with all coordinates multiples of 2
−k.
Definition 12. An increasing set S is k-discretized if S =
⋃
z∈S∩Qk
Bz. A corner c of a k-
discretized set S is a point c ∈ S ∩Qk such that there does not exist z ∈ S \ {c} with z  c.
Lemma 1. Every k-discretized set S has only finitely many corners. Furthermore, S = ∪c∈CBc,
where C is the collection of corners of S.
Proof. We prove that there are finitely many corners by induction on the dimension, n. In the
case n = 1 the result is obvious, since if S is nonempty it has exactly one corner. Now suppose S
has dimension n. Pick some corner cˆ = (c1, . . . , cn) ∈ S. We know that any other corner must be
strictly less than cˆ in some coordinate. Therefore,
|C| ≤ 1+
n∑
i=1
|{c ∈ C s.t. ci < cˆi}| = 1+
n∑
i=1
2k cˆi∑
j=1
∣∣∣c ∈ C s.t. ci = cˆi − 2−kj∣∣∣ .
By the inductive hypothesis, we know that each set
{
c ∈ C s.t. ci = cˆi − 2
−kj
}
is finite, since it
is contained in the set of corners of the (n − 1)-dimensional subset of S whose points have ith
coordinate cˆi − 2
−kj. Therefore, |C| is finite.
To show that S =
⋃
c∈C Bc, pick any z ∈ S. Since S is k-discretized, there exists a b ∈ S ∩Qk
such that z ∈ Bb. If b is a corner, then z is clearly contained in
⋃
c∈C Bc. If b is not a corner, then
there is some other point b′ ∈ S ∩ Qk with b
′  b. If b′ is a corner, we’re done. Otherwise, we
repeat this process at most 2k
∑
j bj times, after which time we will have reached a corner c of S.
By construction, we have z ∈ Bc, as desired.
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We now show that, to verify that one measure dominates another on all increasing sets, it
suffices to verify that this holds for all sets that are the union of finitely many bases.
Lemma 2. Let g, h : Rn≥0 → R≥0 be bounded density functions such that
∫
R
n
≥0
g(~x)d~x and
∫
R
n
≥0
h(~x)d~x
are finite. Suppose that, for all finite collections Z of points in Rn≥0, we have∫
⋃
z∈Z Bz
g(~x)d~x ≥
∫
⋃
z∈Z Bz
h(~x)d~x.
Then, for all increasing sets A, ∫
A
g(~x)d~x ≥
∫
A
h(~x)d~x.
Proof. Let A be an increasing set. We clearly have A =
⋃
z∈ABz. For any point z ∈ R
n
≥0, denote
by zn,k the point in Rn≥0 whose i
th component is the maximum of 0 and zi − 2
−k for each i.
We define
Alk ,
⋃
z∈A∩Qk
Bz; A
u
k ,
⋃
z∈A∩Qk
Bzn,k .
It is clear that both Alk and A
u
k are k-discretized. Furthermore, for any z ∈ A there exists a
z′ ∈ A∩Qk such that each component of z
′ is at most 2−k more than the corresponding component
of z. Therefore
Alk ⊆ A ⊆ A
u
k .
We now will bound ∫
Auk
gd~x−
∫
Alk
gd~x.
Let
Wk = {z : zi > k for some i} ; W
c
k = {z : zi ≤ k for all i}
We notice that ∫
Auk∩Wk
gd~x−
∫
Alk∩Wk
gd~x ≤
∫
Wk
gd~x.
Furthermore, since limk→∞
∫
W ck
gd~x =
∫
R
n
≥0
gd~x, we know that limk→∞
∫
Wk
gd~x = 0. Therefore,
lim
k→∞
(∫
Auk∩Wk
gd~x−
∫
Alk∩Wk
gd~x
)
= 0.
Next, we bound∫
Auk∩W
c
k
gd~x−
∫
Alk∩W
c
k
gd~x ≤ |g|sup
(
V (Auk ∩W
c
k)− V (A
l
k ∩W
c
k)
)
where |g|sup <∞ is the supremum of g, and V (·) denotes the Lebesgue measure.
For each m ∈ {1, . . . , n+ 1} and z ∈ Rn≥0, we define the point z
m,k by:
zm,ki =
{
max{0, zi − 2
−k} if i < m
zi otherwise
and set
Amk ,
⋃
z∈A∩Qk
Bzm,k .
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We have, by construction, Alk = A
1
k and A
u
k = A
n+1
k . Therefore,
V (Auk ∩W
c
k)− V (A
l
k ∩W
c
k) =
n∑
m=1
(
V (Am+1k ∩W
c
k)− V (A
m
k ∩W
c
k)
)
.
We notice that, for any point (z1, z2, . . . , zm−1, zm+1, . . . , zn) ∈ [0, k]
n−1, there is an interval I of
length at most 2−k such that the point
(z1, z2, . . . , zm−1, w, zm−2, . . . , zn) ∈ (A
m+1
k \ A
m
k ) ∩W
c
k
if and only if w ∈ I. Therefore,
V (Am+1k ∩W
c
k )− V (A
m
k ∩W
c
k ) ≤
∫ k
0
· · ·
∫ k
0
∫ k
0
· · ·
∫ k
0
2−kdz1 · · · dzm−1dzm+1 · · · dzn = 2
−kkn−1.
Therefore, we have the bound
|g|sup
(
V (Auk ∩W
c
k)− V (A
l
k ∩W
c
k)
)
≤ |g|sup
n∑
m=1
2−kkn−1 = n|g|sup2
−kkn−1
and thus ∫
Auk
gd~x−
∫
Alk
gd~x =
∫
Auk∩Wk
gd~x−
∫
Alk∩Wk
gd~x+
∫
Auk∩W
c
k
gd~x−
∫
Alk∩W
c
k
gd~x
≤
(∫
Auk∩Wk
gd~x−
∫
Alk∩Wk
gd~x
)
+ n|g|sup2
−kkn−1.
In particular, we have
lim
k→∞
(∫
Auk
gd~x−
∫
Alk
gd~x
)
= 0.
Since
∫
Auk
gd~x ≥
∫
A gd~x ≥
∫
Alk
gd~x, we have
lim
k→∞
∫
Auk
gd~x =
∫
A
gd~x = lim
k→∞
∫
Alk
gd~x.
Similarly, we have ∫
A
hd~x = lim
k→∞
∫
Alk
hd~x
and thus ∫
A
(g − h)d~x = lim
k→∞
(∫
Alk
gd~x−
∫
Alk
hd~x
)
.
Since Alk is k-discretized, it has finitely many corners. Letting Zk denote the corners of A
l
k, we
have Alk =
⋃
z∈Zk
Bz, and thus by our assumption
∫
Alk
gd~x −
∫
Alk
hd~x ≥ 0 for all k. Therefore∫
A(g − h)d~x ≥ 0, as desired.
As an immediate corollary of Lemma 2, we see that to verify ν  µ it suffices to check that
ν(B) ≤ µ(B) for all sets B which are unions of finitely many bases.
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A.2 Stochastic Dominance in Two Dimensions: Proof of Theorem 4
In this section, we prove Theorem 4, which is a useful sufficient condition for stochastic dominance
in two dimensions. To recap, we have C = [c1, d
+
1 ) × [c2, d
+
2 ), R a decreasing nonempty subset of
C, and g, h : C → R≥0 are bounded density functions which are 0 on R, have finite total mass and
satisfy
•
∫
C(g − h)dxdy ≥ 0.
• For any basis vector ei ∈ {(0, 1), (1, 0)} and any point z
∗ ∈ R:
∫ d+i −z∗i
0
g(z∗ + τei)− h(z
∗ + τei)dτ ≤ 0.
• There exist non-negative functions α : [c1, d
+
1 ) → R≥0 and β : [c2, d
+
2 ) → R≥0 and an
increasing function η : C → R such that
g(z1, z2)− h(z1, z2) = α(z1) · β(z2) · η(z1, z2)
for all (z1, z2) ∈ C \R.
We aim to prove that g  h.
We begin by defining, for any c1 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ d
+
1 , the function ζ
b
a : [c2, d
+
2 )→ R by
ζba(w) ,
∫ b
a
(g(z1, w) − h(z1, w))dz1.
This function represents, for each w, the integral of g − h along the line from (a,w) to (b, w).
Claim 5. If (a,w) ∈ R, then ζba(w) ≤ 0.
Proof. The inequality trivially holds unless there exists a z1 ∈ [a, b] such that g(z1, w) > h(z1, w).
So suppose such a z1 exists. It must be that (z1, w) /∈ R as both g and h are 0 in R. Indeed, because
R is a decreasing set it is also true that (z˜1, w) /∈ R for all z˜1 ≥ z1. This implies by assumption
that
g(z˜1, w) − h(z˜1, w) = α(z˜1) · β(w) · η(z˜1, w),
for all z˜1 ≥ z1. Now given that g(z1, w) > h(z1, w) and η(·, w) is an increasing function, we get
that g(z˜1, w) ≥ h(z˜1, w) for all z˜1 ≥ z1. Therefore, we have
ζz1a (w) ≤ ζ
b
a(w) ≤ ζ
d+1
a (w).
We notice, however, that ζ
d+1
a (w) ≤ 0 by assumption, and thus the claim is proven.
We now claim the following:
Claim 6. Suppose that ζba(w
∗) > 0 for some w∗ ∈ [c2, d
+
2 ). Then ζ
b
a(w) ≥ 0 for all w ∈ [w
∗, d+2 ).
Proof. Given that ζba(w
∗) > 0, our previous claim implies that (a,w∗) 6∈ R. Furthermore, since R
is a decreasing set and w ≥ w∗, follows that (a,w) 6∈ R, and furthermore that (c, w) 6∈ R for any
c ≥ a in [c1, d
+
1 ). Therefore, we may write
ζba(w) =
∫ b
a
(g(z1, w) − h(z1, w))dz1 =
∫ b
a
(α(z1) · β(w) · η(z1, w))dz1.
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Similarly, (c, w∗) 6∈ R for any c ≥ a, so
ζba(w
∗) =
∫ b
a
(α(z1) · β(w
∗) · η(z1, w
∗))dz1.
Note that, since ζba(w
∗) > 0, we have β(w∗) > 0. Thus, since η is increasing,
ζba(w) ≥
∫ b
a
(α(z1) · β(w) · η(z1, w
∗))dz1 =
β(w)
β(w∗)
ζba(w
∗) ≥ 0,
as desired.
We extend g and h to all of R2≥0 by setting them to be 0 outside of C. By Claim 2, to prove
that g  h it suffices to prove that
∫
A gdxdy ≥
∫
A hdxdy for all sets A which are the union of
finitely many bases. Since g and h are 0 outside of C, it suffices to consider only bases Bz′ where
z′ ∈ C, since otherwise we can either remove the base (if it is disjoint from C) or can increase the
coordinates of z′ moving it to C without affecting the value of either integral.
We now prove Theorem 4 by induction on the number of bases in the union.
• Base Case.
We aim to show
∫
Br
(g − h)dxdy ≥ 0 for any r = (r1, r2) ∈ C. We have
∫
Br
(g − h)dxdy =
∫ d+2
r2
∫ d+1
r1
(g − h)dz1dz2 =
∫ d+2
r2
ζ
d+1
r1 (z2)dz2.
By Claim 6, we know that either ζ
d+1
r1 (z2) ≥ 0 for all z2 ≥ r2, or ζ
d+1
r1 (z2) ≤ 0 for all z2 between
c2 and r2. In the first case, the integral is clearly nonnegative, so we may assume that we are
in the second case. We then have∫ d+2
r2
ζ
d+1
r1 (z2)dz2 ≥
∫ d+2
c2
ζ
d+1
r1 (z2)dz2 =
∫ d+2
c2
∫ d+1
r1
(g − h)dz1dz2 =
∫ d+1
r1
∫ d+2
c2
(g − h)dz2dz1.
By an analogous argument to that above, we know that either
∫ d+2
c2
(g − h)(z1, z2)dz2 is non-
negative for all z1 ≥ r1 (in which case the desired inequality holds trivially) or is nonpositive
for all z1 between c1 and r1. We assume therefore that we are in the second case, and thus∫ d+1
r1
∫ d+2
c2
(g − h)dz2dz1 ≥
∫ d+1
c1
∫ d+2
c2
(g − h)dz2dz1 =
∫
C
(g − h)dxdy,
which is nonnegative by assumption.
• Inductive Step. Suppose that we have proven the result for all finite unions of at most k
bases. Consider now a set
A =
k+1⋃
i=1
Bz(i) .
We may assume that all z(i) are distinct, and that there do not exist distinct z(i), z(j) with
z(i)  z(j), since otherwise we could remove one such Bz(i) from the union without affecting
the set A, and the desired inequality would follow from the inductive hypothesis.
Therefore, we may order the z(i) such that
c1 ≤ z
(k+1)
1 < z
(k)
1 < z
(k−1)
1 < · · · < z
(1)
1
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c1
c2
z(k+1)
z(k)
z(k−1)
R
z1
z 2
Figure 7: We show that either decreasing z
(k+1)
2 to z
(k)
2 or removing z
(k+1) entirely decreases the
value of
∫
A(f − g). In either case, we can apply our inductive hypothesis.
and
c2 ≤ z
(1)
2 < z
(2)
2 < z
(3)
2 < · · · < z
(k+1)
2 .
By Claim 6, we know that one of the two following cases must hold:
– Case 1: ζ
z
(k)
1
z
(k+1)
1
(w) ≤ 0 for all c2 ≤ w ≤ z
(k+1)
2 .
In this case, we see that
∫ z(k+1)2
z
(k)
2
∫ z(k)1
z
(k+1)
1
(f − g)dz1dz2 =
∫ z(k+1)2
z
(k)
2
ζ
z
(k)
1
z
(k+1)
1
(w)dw ≤ 0.
For notational purposes, we will denote by (f − g)(S) the integral
∫
S(f − g)dz1dz2 for
any set S. We now have
(f − g)(A) ≥ (f − g)(A) + (f − g)
({
z : z
(k+1)
1 ≤ z1 ≤ z
(k)
1 and z
(k)
2 ≤ z2 ≤ z
(k+1)
2
})
= (f − g)
(
k⋃
i=1
Bz(i) ∪B(z(k+1)1 ,z
(k)
2 )
)
= (f − g)
(
k−1⋃
i=1
Bz(i) ∪B(z(k+1)1 ,z
(k)
2 )
)
where the last equality follows from (z
(k)
1 , z
(k)
2 )  (z
(k+1)
1 , z
(k)
2 ). Now the inductive hy-
pothesis implies that the quantity in the last line of the above derivation is ≥ 0.
– Case 2: ζ
z
(k)
1
z
(k+1)
1
(w) ≥ 0 for all w ≥ z
(k+1)
2 .
In this case, we have
∫ d+2
z
(k+1)
2
∫ z(k)1
z
(k+1)
1
(f − g)dz1dz2 =
∫ d+2
z
(k+1)
2
ζ
z
(k)
1
z
(k+1)
1
(w)dw ≥ 0.
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Therefore, it follows that
(f − g)(A) = (f − g)
(
k⋃
i=1
Bz(i)
)
+ (f − g)
({
z : z
(k+1)
1 ≤ z1 ≤ z
(k)
1 and z
(k+1)
2 ≤ z2
})
≥ (f − g)
(
k⋃
i=1
Bz(i)
)
≥ 0,
where the final inequality follows from the inductive hypothesis.
B Bundling Two Power-Law Items
In this section, we complete the proof that a take-it-or-leave-it offer of the grand bundle is the opti-
mal mechanism for selling two power-law items with c1 = 6 and c2 = 7. Based on our calculations
in Section 8, it remains to show that µX |Wp∗  ν
Y |Wp∗ , where p
∗ = .35725. We set g = µXd |Wp∗ and
h = νYd |Wp∗ and now must verify that the conditions of Theorem 4 indeed apply.
The condition
∫
R2
≥0
(g − h)dxdy = 0 is satisfied by construction of p∗.
Since µX and νY have disjoint supports we notice that for any z ∈Wp∗ we have
µXd (z) − ν
Y
d (z) =
(
c1z1
1 + z1
+
c2z2
1 + z2
− 3
)
f1(z1) · f2(z2).
Thus, the third condition of Theorem 4 is satisfied with α(z1) = f1(z1), β(z2) = f2(z2), and
η(z1, z2) =
c1z1
1+z1
+ c2z21+z2 − 3, noting that η is indeed an increasing function.
All that remains is to verify the second condition of Theorem 4. We break this verification into
two parts, depending on whether we are integrating with respect to z1 or z2.
• We begin by considering integration with respect to z1. That is, for any fixed 0 ≤ z2 ≤ p
∗,
we must prove that∫ ∞
p∗−z2
(
c1z1
1 + z1
+
c2z2
1 + z2
− 3
)
c1 − 1
(1 + z1)c1
·
c2 − 1
(1 + z2)c2
dz1 ≤ 0.
Since z2 is fixed, it clearly suffices to prove that∫ ∞
p∗−z2
(
6z1
1 + z1
+
7z2
1 + z2
− 3
)
1
(1 + z1)6
dz1 ≤ 0.
This integral evaluates to
−0.18565 + 1.1145z2 − 2z
2
2
(1.35725 − z2)6(1 + z2)
.
Since the denominator is always positive, it suffices to prove that the numerator is negative.
Indeed, the numerator is maximized at z2 = .2786, in which case the numerator evaluates to
−.0304.
• We now consider integration with respect to z2. Analogously to the computation above, for
any fixed 0 ≤ z1 ≤ p
∗ we must prove that∫ ∞
p∗−z1
(
6z1
1 + z1
+
7z2
1 + z2
− 3
)
1
(1 + z2)7
dz2 ≤ 0.
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This integral evaluates to
−0.0951667 + .595416z1 − 1.66667z
2
1
(1.35725 − z1)7(1 + z1)
.
As before, it suffices to prove that the numerator is negative. We verify that, indeed, the
numerator achieves its maximum at z1 = .178625, in which case the numerator is −.0419886.
Therefore, we have proven, by Theorem 4, that µX |Wp∗  ν
Y |Wp∗ , as desired.
C Optimal Mechanism Design in Two Dimensions: Proof of The-
orem 6
Here we complete the proof of Theorem 6. We must show that a bidder of type (z1, z2) never has
incentive of falsely declaring a type (z∗1 , z
∗
2) in the following mechanism:
• If (z1, z2) ∈ Z, the bidder receives no goods and is charged 0.
• If (z1, z2) ∈ A, the bidder receives item 1 with probability −s
′(z1), item 2 with probability 1,
and is charged s(z1)− z1s
′(z1).
• If (z1, z2) ∈ B, the bidder receives item 1 with probability 1, item 2 with probability−1/s
′(s−1(z2)),
and is charged s−1(z2)− z2/s
′(s−1(z2)).
• If (z1, z2) ∈ W, the bidder receives both goods with probability 1 and is charged a+ s(a).
The proof considers several cases.
• Case: (z∗1 , z
∗
2) ∈ Z.
In this scenario, it will never be in the player’s interest to change his bid to (z∗1 , z
∗
2). Indeed,
he receives 0 utility by bidding in Z, while his utility of truthful bidding is never negative.
• Case: (z1, z2) ∈ Z.
We first argue that the bidder has no incentive to deviate to a bid (z∗1 , z
∗
2) ∈ W. Indeed, since
(z1, z2) ∈ Z, it follows that z1 + z2 ≤ a+ s(a), and therefore by deviating to a bid in W the
player’s new utility will not be positive.
Similarly, we argue that the bidder has no incentive to bid (z∗1 , z
∗
2) ∈ A. By deviating, the
bidder will receive utility
−z1s
′(z∗1) + z2 − s(z
∗
1) + z
∗
1s
′(z∗1) = (z
∗
1 − z1)s
′(z∗1) + (z2 − s(z
∗
1))
≤ (z∗1 − z1)s
′(z∗1) + (s(z1)− s(z
∗
1)).
We claim that this term utility is at most 0. Indeed, if z1 ≤ z
∗
1 , then the first term is negative
while the second term is positive, and the desired inequality follows by concavity of s. If
z∗1 ≤ z1, then the first term is positive while the second is negative, and the result once again
follows from concavity.
The proof that the bidder has no incentive to bid (z∗1 , z
∗
2) ∈ B is identical.
• Case: (z1, z2) and (z
∗
1 , z
∗
2) ∈ W.
By falsely declaring (z∗1 , z
∗
2), the bidder will still receive both goods for price of a+ s(a), and
his utility will be unchanged.
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• Case: (z1, z2) and (z
∗
1 , z
∗
2) ∈ A.
When truthful, the bidder receives utility z2−s(z1). By declaring (z
∗
1 , z
∗
2) instead, the bidder’s
utility instead is z2 − z1s
′(z∗1) − s(z
∗
1) + z
∗
1s
′(z∗1). Thus, the difference between the truthful
and non-truthful utilities is
z2 − s(z1)−
(
z2 − z1s
′(z∗1)− s(z
∗
1) + z
∗
1s
′(z∗1)
)
= s(z∗1)− s(z1) + s
′(z∗1)(z1 − z
∗
1)
≥ 0
where the final inequality follows from the identical argument to the case (z1, z2) ∈ Z.
• Case: (z1, z2) and (z
∗
1 , z
∗
2) ∈ B.
This case is identical to the case (z1, z2) and (z
∗
1 , z
∗
2) ∈ A.
• Case: (z1, z2) ∈ A and (z
∗
1 , z
∗
2) ∈ W.
This case is nearly identical to the case (z1, z2) and (z
∗
1 , z
∗
2) ∈ A. Indeed, consider the function
s∗ : R≥0 → R which is identical to s on [0, b] but continues downwards at a 45
◦ angle on [b,∞].
We notice that, for (z∗1 , z
∗
2) ∈ W, we have −s
∗′(z∗1) = 1 and
s∗(z∗1)− z
∗
1s
∗′(z∗1) = s
∗(z1) + z1 = a+ s(a).
Therefore, the exact same analysis holds as in the prior case, treating (z∗1 , z
∗
2) as being in A
and where we replacing s with s∗.
• Case: (z1, z2) ∈ W and (z
∗
1 , z
∗
2) ∈ A.
We use an analogous argument to the previous case: after replacing s∗ for s, we can view W
in the same manner as A.
• Case: (z1, z2) ∈ B and (z
∗
1 , z
∗
2) ∈ W.
This is analogous to the case (z1, z2) ∈ A and (z
∗
1 , z
∗
2) ∈ W.
• Case: (z1, z2) ∈ W and (z
∗
1 , z
∗
2) ∈ B.
This is analogous to the case (z1, z2) ∈ W and (z
∗
1 , z
∗
2) ∈ A.
• Case: (z1, z2) ∈ B and (z
∗
1 , z
∗
2) ∈ A.
The difference between truthfully bidding (z1, z2) and falsely declaring (z
∗
1 , z
∗
2) is(
z1 − s
−1(z2)
)
−
(
−z1s
′(z∗1) + z2 − s(z
∗
1) + z
∗
1s
′(z∗1)
)
= (s(z∗1)− z2) + (z1 − s
−1(z2))− (−s
′(z∗1)(z1 − z
∗
1)).
We aim to prove that the above quantity is nonnegative. Since (z1, z2) ∈ B and (z
∗
1 , z
∗
2) ∈ A,
we have the following inequalities:
z∗1 < s
−1(z2) ≤ z1
z2 < s(z
∗
1) ≤ z
∗
2
and therefore (s(z∗1)−z2), (z1−s
−1(z2)), and (−s
′(z∗1)(z1−z
∗
1)) are all positive. In particular,
the desired inequality is immediate if s′(z∗1) = 0, and we may therefore assume that s
′(z∗1) < 0.
We may also assume that (−s′(z∗1)(z1 − z
∗
1)) > s(z
∗
1) − z2, since otherwise the inequality is
immediate. Therefore, there exists an x in between z∗1 and z1 such that
(−s′(z∗1)(x− z
∗
1)) = s(z
∗
1)− z2.
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We claim now that x ≥ s−1(z2). Indeed, since s is convex and decreasing, we compute
−s′(z∗1)(s
−1(z2)− z
∗
1) ≤
s(z∗1)− z2
s−1(z2)− z
∗
1
· (s−1(z2)− z
∗
1) = s(z
∗
1)− z2.
Since −s′(z∗1)(x− z
∗
1) is an increasing function of x, it follows that s
−1(z2) ≤ x ≤ z1. We now
write the difference between bidding (z1, z2) and falsely declaring (z
∗
1 , z
∗
2) as
(s(z∗1)− z2) + (z1 − s
−1(z2))− (−s
′(z∗1)(z1 − z
∗
1)) =
(s(z∗1)− z2) + (z1 − s
−1(z2))− (−s
′(z∗1)(x− z
∗
1))− (−s
′(z∗1)(z1 − x)) =
(z1 − s
−1(z2))− (−s
′(z∗1)(z1 − x)) ≥
(z1 − x)− (−s
′(z∗1)(z1 − x)).
Since (z∗1 , z
∗
2) ∈ A, it follows that −1 ≤ s
′(z∗1) ≤ 0, and the above expression is therefore
nonnegative, as desired.
• Case: (z1, z2) ∈ A and (z
∗
1 , z
∗
2) ∈ B.
This is identical to the case (z1, z2) ∈ B and (z
∗
1 , z
∗
2) ∈ A.
We have thus shown that the bidder never has incentive to deviate from his truthful strategy, and
therefore the mechanism is truthful.
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